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Judicial Supervision of
Transnational Commercial Arbitration:
The English Arbitration Act of 1979t

WILLIAM W. PARK*

If the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the
quality of the goods and the speed of service.
-Lord Denning**
Present day interaction between court and arbitrator is reminiscent of the
seventeenth century struggle between court and crown, in which King
James I claimed that his representatives should have the right to adjudicate disputes according to "natural reason," not according to the "artificial ... judgment of the law." 1 The Lord Chief Justice, Edward
Coke, resisted this arrogation of power using words attributed to
Bracton: "quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege."2
Although under no man, the King was subject to God and the law.
The extent to which the modern commercial arbitrator should likewise be under the law, i.e., subject to judicial review, has recently been
the subject of lively debate in England. The debate culminated in 1979
with the enactment of legislation' permitting greater arbitral autonomy
t @ William W. Park, i98o.
0 Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; Fellow, Selwyn College, Cambridge
University; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1972; B.A., Yale University, 1969.
** The Atlantic Star, [i973] I Q.B. 364, 382.
i. E. Coxr, Prohibitions del Roy, in 12 Coxes REPoRTs 63, 65 (London 16o8). For a
description of "the memorable Sunday Morning" of Coke's pronouncement, see R. POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE CosmwON LAW 6o (1921).
2. E. CoxE, supra note i, at 65. See generally

5 W.

HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY Op ENOLIsn

LAw 430-31 (1937).
3. Arbitration Act, 1979, c 42 [hereinafter cited as the Act]. The Act became effective
on Aug. ,, 1979. STAT. INsT. No. 750 (979). The Act applies to England and Wales but
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in the resolution of international commercial disputes. Under the Arbitration Act of 1979, parties to international contracts,4 other than those
concerning maritime, insurance, or commodities matters,0 may foreclose
judicial review by an "exclusion agreement" in the commercial contract.
Prior to -theeffective date of the Act, August i,i979,0 English courts
could intervene extensively in arbitrations held in England and Wales.
The High Court could direct an arbitrator to submit any point of
English law to the courts for judicial determination, pursuant to the
"special case" or "case stated" procedure.7 In this manner, the court's
conclusions on the legal merits of a case were substituted for those of
the arbitrator.
The case stated procedure was criticized as adding delay in the
rendering of binding awards." This delay constituted an obstacle to
enforcement of English awards under the 1958 New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,'
not to Scotland. Act, supra, § 8(4). The law of Scotland is discussed at note 17 infra.
The literature on the Act and the debate engendering it includes: 392 PAr. DEB., H.L.
( 5 th ser.) 89 (1978); 397 PAEL. DEB., H.L. (5th set.) 434-64 (1978-79); 398 PAUt.
DEB., H.L. ( 5 th ser.) 529-74, 1465-82 (1979). COMIERCIAL COURT COs,1TTEE, REPORT
ON ABtrrRATON, CMND. No. 7284 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COs2,s1,RCIAL COURT
REPORT]; Marshall, The Arbitration Aet 1979, 1979 J. Bus. L. 241; SchmittholT, The
Reform of the English Law of Arbitration, 1977 J. Bus. L. 305; Staughton, Arbitration
Act 1979 -

.4 Pragmatic Compromise, 129 NEw L.J. 920 (1979); Comment, England

and Wales: Arbitration Act of 1979, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 463 (1979); Address by Lord
Diplock, The Alexander Lecture, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London (Feb. 28,
1978), reprinted in 44 ARB. 107 (1978).

4. For the Act's definition of an international contract, see text accompanying note 71
infra.
5. The authors of the Act refer to such a contract as "one-off," see note 73 infra, indicating that it is negotiated ad hoc, as distinguished from the standard form contracts
common in shipping, insurance, and commodities transactions. Act, supra note 3, § 4(l).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 37-42 infra.
9. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
io,1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter cited as New York
Convention]. On the New York Convention, see generally G. GAyA, INTERNATIONAL
COaMMERciAL ARmTsRAToN: NEw YoRx CONvENTION (1978); Sanders, A Twenty Years'

Review of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwards,
13 INT'L LAw. 269 (1979). On Dec. 31, 1978, fifty-two states were parties to the New
York Convention. The United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and many of the
other states involved in international trade and arbitration are parties to the Convention.
The parties are listed in 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1979). The United States enacted domestic
implementing legislation in 1970. Pub. L. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 2oi-o8 (1976)). On the operation of the Convention in the United States, see generally
Trooboff & Goldstein, Foreign Arbitral Awards and the z958 New YorA Convention:
Experience to Date in the U.S. Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 469 (x977). See also Quigley,
Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961). Other international
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which provides that awards not binding under the law of the state
in which they are rendered may be refused recognition in a foreign
state.'0 It was argued that this delay in the rendering of enforceable awards deprived England of substantial revenue in the form of
fees to arbitrators, barristers, and solicitors, by discouraging foreign
companies from choosing London as the location for their arbitrations."
Concern for this invisible export led to the adoption of the Arbitration
Act of

1979,

which substituted a new appeals process for the case stated

procedure.
Enactment of the Arbitration Act of 1979 raises important questions
about the scope of judicial review needed for fair, effective transnational
commercial dispute settlement. This article will examine the recent
English legislation in order to focus on and to explore these questions."2
After reviewing the English practice before and after the effective date
of the 1979 Act, the article will describe, for comparative purposes, the
requirements that other major arbitral centers'13 consider necessary to
the creation of valid, binding awards. Finally, it will examine the impact
of the international arbitral process on the groups, communities, and
institutions participating in and affected by transnational trade and
4
investment.1
treaties on arbitration include: European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, April 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364; Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Awards of 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301; Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 23,
1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157.
io. New York Convention, supra note 9, art. V(i) (e). See also id. art. VI, which provides that an enforcing court may adjourn its decision on enforcement if an application
has been made to set aside the award in the country in which it was rendered. Other
grounds for refusal of an award are set out in art. V(i) (defenses that party against whom
the award is rendered must invoke) and art. V(2) (matters that may be raised on the
court's own motion).
Ix. See text accompanying notes 48-50 infra.
12. See generally G. DLAums, TRANsNATioNAL. CONTRACTS § 13 (1978); INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, HOMMAGE A FREDE.IC EIS^MANN (Liber Amicorum ed. 1978);
1-2 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AaBIRAoN (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1979); 1-4 INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, YEARooK: CoMMERCIAL ARBmRON

(P. Sanders ed. x976-79); Mann, State Contracts and International Arbitration, in
STUDIEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (1973); II J. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL

PROCESS (979); Ehrenhaft, Effective InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 9 L. & PoL'r
INT'L Bus. 1191 (1977); Shareholders and Arbitration Clauses, 7 INT'L Bus. LAw. 129
(979); Symposium -International Commercial Arbitration, 13 INT'L LAW. 209 (1979);
A Symposium on the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, 17 VA. J.

INT'L L. 729 (1977).
13. The other principal centers for international arbitration are Paris, Stockholm,
Geneva, Zurich, New York, and The Hague.
14. There is an inevitable tension between parties' reasons for initially opting for
arbitration and their reasons for seeking judicial review or the state's legitimate interest
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Preliminary definitions are in order to distinguish the judicial from
the arbitral form of conflict resolution. Judicial dispute resolution draws
its authority from the sovereign which created the court. It places a
premium on certainty of result, creating community standards of appropriate behavior according to which businessmen may plan their commercial transactions. Arbitral dispute resolution derives its authority
from contract. Decision makers are chosen by the litigants, rather than
by the community, and the "submission agreement," or compromis,
creates and defines the arbitral power. The arbitral power is often
created indirecdy, by reference to rules of the International Chamber
of Commerce, or of the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, and the like. " While parties create their own
dispute resolution mechanisms as an alternative to court settlement,
they sometimes ask a court to provide post-arbitration enforcement
proceedings. The enforcing court may be called on to examine the fairness of the arbitration procedure or the arbitrator's respect for the limits
of his authority. The law applied may be that of the place where the
in review. See generally text accompanying notes 186-217 infra. The Arbitration Act of
1979 represents one means of resolving this tension. However, as discussed at text accompanying notes 93-1o8, 218-22o infra, any attempt to provide for complete exclusion of
judicial supervision is likely to be disappointing. A more fruitful approach to the resolution of this tension would be to formulate a functionally useful definition of arbitral error
sufficiently gross to warrant judicial intervention.
This article will not deal with arbitration of public conflicts between states. For excellent
treatments of judicial review of public international arbitration, see W. REISMAN, NULLITY
ANn RavsioN (1971); Schreuer, The Implementation of International Judicial Decisions
by Domestic Courts, 24 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 153 (1975). See also A. STuYT, SuRVa oF
INTERNATioNAL AIrBIRATIONS 1794-1970 (1972).
x5. Examples of arbitral institutions used for settlement of transnational commercial
disputes include the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the London Court of
Arbitration, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the American Arbitration Association, and the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes. See generally J. Warra., supra note 12, at X20-254.
The number of new cases introduced before the International Chamber of Commerce
rose from 184 per annum in 1975 to 270 in 1979. All were international in character.
Statistics were compiled by the International Chamber of Commerce and forwarded in a
letter from Yves Derains, Secretary General of the ICC Court of Arbitration to the author
(Nov. 22, 1979). London arbitral bodies are reported to handle approximately 75oo new
international arbitrations per year. This large number is due to the use of London for
settlement of disputes in the maritime, insurance, and commodities areas, through the
London Trade Association (including the Grain and Feed Trade Association - GAFTA),
the London Maritime Arbitrators Association, and the London Court of Arbitration.
Address by Lord Hacking, International Commercial Arbitrations -Recent Developments
in London, Paris, and Stockholm 4, Society of Maritime Arbitrators, New York (Feb. 20,
1979). The international caseload of the American Arbitration Association is reported to
have risen from 61 arbitrations introduced in 1975 to ioo introduced in 1977. J. Wuarn,
supranote z2, at 124.
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arbitration proceedings were held (lex arbitri)16 or that of the court
called on to recognize and enforce the award.
JUDICIAL SUPERVISION IN ENGLAND
The Apogee of Intervention:English Law Before 1979
English 17 law traditionally has been marked by extensive judicial intervention in the arbitral process. Courts intervened to enforce discovery
orders,' 8 to remove lazy arbitrators,' 9 or to extend the time for the
commencement of the arbitration,2" each of which aided the progress
of the proceedings. Prior to the 1979 Act, courts also intervened to
review the arbitrator's substantive legal decisions. The parties to an
arbitration could not, by contract, exclude judicial review of the merits
of the dispute.2 '
The law provided two primary devices for judicial review of the
legal merits of an arbitration. First, an award might be set aside for
"error on its face" if documents incorporated into the award demonI6. On the lex arbitri's practical importance, see generally Hirsch, The Place of Arbitration and The Lex Arbitri, 34 AraB. J. 43 (Sept. 1979).
17. A tradition of extensive judicial intervention into the arbitral process marked the
law which governed England and Wales, but not Scotland. The "special case" procedure,
see text accompanying notes 23-36 infra, was introduced into Scotland only in 1972.
Unlike in England, however, the parties have always been able to exclude such right of
appeal by contract. Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act, 1972, C. 59 § 3(I). Even
before 1972, however, it was possible in some cases of statutory arbitration (e.g., rural
landlord/tenant arbitration) to "state the case." See, e.g., Agricultural Holdings (Scotland)
Act, 19o8, 8 Edw. 7, c. 64, as applied in Mitchell-Gill v. Buchan, [1921] Sess. Cas. 390
(Ist Div. Scot.). In Miller v. Wentworth St. Estates, [1970] i All E.R. 796 (H.L.), the
case stated procedure was held inapplicable to an Anglo-Scottish arbitration held in Scotland despite applicability of English substantive law.
18. Arbitration Act, 195o, r4 Geo. 6, C. 27, § 12(4)-(5).
19. Id. § 13(3).
20. Id. § 27. For a recent example, see Consolidated Investment and Contracting Co. v.
Saponaria The Virgo Shipping Co., [1978J 3 All E.R. 988 (C.A.). Cargo owners had
chartered a ship from Romania to Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Charterers failed to institute
arbitration proceedings for shortlanding of softwood within a year after delivery, as
required by the contract. Because the cargo owners were "soothed into inactivity" by
shipowner's insurers, the Court of Appeal held that they were allowed an extension of
time to bring the arbitration.
21. In 1922, the Court of Appeal held, as a matter of public policy, that judicial review
of arbitration in England could not be excluded by contract. Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt
& Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 478 (C.A.). Also, the parties could not give the arbitrator the right
to decide according to equitable rather than legal principles (as amiable compositeur),
since the court would then have no basis on which to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
See Schmitthoff, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of English Courts, in INTRNATIONAL AMsAToioN: LIER AmtscoRus FOR MATIN DOM.s
289 (P. Sanders ed. 1967). On amiable
composition in general, see Simons, Amiable Compositions and Their Reasoning, in 2
INTERNATIONAL CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 12, at 130.
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strated that the arbitrator based his decision on erroneous conclusions of
law 2 2 Arbitrators could avoid this procedure by failing to include
reasons for the award or by justifying the decision in a document which
was expressly not made a part of the award. Consequently, this mode
of judicial review was not of practical importance to modern commercial arbitration.
Second, an arbitrator could seek judicial assistance on any question
of law by "stating the case" on his own initiative or upon order by the
High Court' A party could ask the arbitrator to state the case. If
the arbitrator refused, the party could seek a court order requiring the
arbitrator to state the case 4 Because a party's application for statement
of the case had to be made prior to the rendering of the award, courts
did not know whether the question of law would be included in the
arbitrator's decision, and thus hesitated to deny a party's request.2 5
Asking for a statement of the case was risky, however, because a party
incurred additional cost and delay when it might have won anyway,
or because it might lose before the High Court after having received
a favorable award from the arbitrator 6
Statement of the case provided the principal mechanism for judicial
review prior to the 1979 Act. The request for judicial guidance could
be made during the arbitration proceedings, in which case it was called
a "consultative case." 27 Otherwise, the arbitrator stated the questions at
the end of the proceedings in the form of "alternative final awards." 28
22. For a discussion of setting aside an award for "error on its face," see Government of
Kelantan v. Duff Dev. Co., [1923] A.C. 395, 409 (H.L.). See COMMERCIAL COURT
REPORT, supra note 3, at 5; II INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1977 YEARuOOK
OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ii (1977).

23. Arbitration Act, 1950, supra note 18, § 21. Section 2x provides:

(a) An arbitrator or umpire may, and shall if so directed by the High Court, state (a) any question of law arising in the course of 'the reference; or
(b) an award or any part of an award, in the form of a special case for the

decision of the High Court.
(2) A special case with respect of an interim award or with respect to a question
of law arising in the course of a reference may be stated, or may be directed by the
High Court to be stated, notwithstanding that proceedings under the reference are

still pending.
24. COMMERCIAL COURT REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
25. Id.

26. See, e.g., Ismail v. Polish Ocean Lines, [1976] a Q.B. 893 (C.A.) (claimant who
insisted on statement of the case received nothing, rather than the two-thirds of the

damages the arbitrator would have awarded.)
27. Arbitration Act, x95o, supra note 18, § 21 () (a). The term "consultative case" was
applied by commentators. See, e.g., Schmitthoff, supra note 21, at 294.

28. Arbitration Act, 1950, supra note 18, § 21(l)(b). The term "alternative final
awards" was applied by commentators. See, e.g., Schmitthoff, supra note 21, at 294. An
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Although statement of the case was originally a procedure by which
an arbitrator could request judicial assistance,2" in time it became a
mechanism to limit arbitrator autonomy. Escape hatches from judicial
review were dosed in 1922 when England's "greatest Court of Appeal
in commercial matters" 0 held that the supervisory jurisdiction of
English courts could not be abrogated by contract. "There must be no
Alsatia in England where the King's writ does not run," wrote Lord
Scrutton in the celebrated case of Czarnikou, v. Roth, Schmidt & Co.3 '
Raising the prospect that arbitral awards might be obtained by fraud if
judicial review was unavailable, Lord Scrutton stated that it was contrary to English public policy for a court to recognize, and by its power
to support, any "erroneous administration of the Law." 32 Although the
rule was premised on a fear of fraud, it was not limited to situations
in which there was a particular risk of fraud or commercial duress, for
instance, when parties use standard form contracts, rather than agreements negotiated ad hoc, or agree to arbitrate future rather than existing disputes.
The death knell of arbitrator autonomy came in 1973 in Halfdan
Greig & Co. v. Sterling Coal & Nay. Corp.,33 a case frequently referred
to as the "Lysland" case, after the name of the ship which was involved.
In Lysland, the Court of Appeals ordered that the case be stated over
the arbitrator's objection, reasoning that agreements made to arbitrate
disputes in London had been made under the assumption that points of
law could be referred to judicial determination. Lord Denning set forth
a tripartite test of those questions that should be stated:
The point of law should be real and substantial and such as to be
example of an alternative award is: "[I]f Party B may not by contract exclude liability for
gross negligence, then Party A shall recover $xoo; if the exculpatory clause is valid, Party
A recovers nothing." id.
29. Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125,

§ V.

3o. As per Lord Diplock, The Alexander Lecture, supra note 3, at zo8.
31. [1922] 2 K.B. 478, 488 (CA.). One may wonder whether the same result would
have obtained had the agreement to exclude court supervision been entered into after,
rather than before, the dispute. Post-dispute arbitration carries with it less danger of a
stronger party imposing its will on a weaker one, since the latter can insist on a judicial
resolution at that moment without fear of losing the business deal. If the clause providing
for the arbitration of future disputes is imposed as part of a "take it or leave it" deal,
however, the exclusion agreement may not be genuinely voluntary.
32. Id. at 489.
33. Halfdan Grieg & Co. A/S v. Sterling Coal & Nay. Corp., [1973) 1 Q.B. 843 (C.A.)
(The Lysland).
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open to serious argument and appropriate for decision by a court of
law . . .
*.. clear cut and capable of being accurately stated as a point of
law . . .
of such importance that the resolution of it is necessary for the
proper determination of the case. 4
...

Consequently, it was commonly presumed that courts would consider
denial of an application made by a party to state the case, other than
the most frivolous requests, would be considered "misconduct" " by the
arbitrator, a ground for which the award might be set asideP0
Criticism of the case stated procedure was made by scholars,"7 legislators,38 judges, 9 the Lord Chancellor Elwyn-Jones4" and the distinguished Lord Diplock, President of the British Institute of Arbitrators. 4'
These critics alleged that the procedure provided a delaying tactic for
undeserving parties, whereby a party to an arbitration who feared that
it was about to lose on the merits would put off the evil day of paying
the award by requesting a statement of the case. 42 Some delay was
inevitable: the arbitrator was required to spend time to prepare the
consultative question or alternative awards; the court had to set a
hearing date; full argument might take place; and there might be
appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal, and thence to the
House of Lords. The party favored by the arbitral award would, in
34. Id. at 861--62.
35. Arbitrator "misconduct," proscribed by § 23 of the Arbitration Act of x95o, stipra
note 18, seems to include a multitude of petty sins. See COMMERCIAL CoMm TTFE REPORT,
supra note 3, at s7 '(recommending a limitation on use of the term "misconduct").
36. An exception to the rule that an award will be set aside for arbitrator misconduct is
the case where a question of law is expressly referred by the parties to the arbitrator. See,
e.g., Government of Kelantan v. Duff Dev. Co., [1923] A.C. 395, 409 (H.L.).
37. See, e.g., Schmitthoff, The Reform of the English Law of Arbitration, 1977 J. Bus.
L. 305.
38. 392 PARL. DEB., supra note 3; 397 PARL. DEB., supra note 3; 398 PAEL. DEB.,
supra note 3.
39. COMMERCIAL CoURT REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
40. 397 PARL. DEB., supra note 3, at 437.

4. The Alexander Lecture, supra note 3.
42. Lord Hacking, one of the early sponsors of the Act, jested that as a result of the
potential for abuse, "the point was reached that the Legal Department of major companies
...refused to permit an English arbitration clause in any agreements into which the
company entered." Lord Hacking, supra note 15, at 25. Hacking joked that it was
alleged by "a distinguished partner of a distinguished Wall Street law firm . . . to be a
matter of professional negligence to allow an English arbitration clause in any contracts
possessed by clients of [the] firm." Id. at I.

198o

/ Judicial Supervision of Transnational Arbitration

95

the meantime, be denied the award, thereby extending to the unmeritorious party an essentially interest-free loan.
A survey of cases stated between 196o and I979, 4' however, demon-

strates that the case stated procedure was not merely a tool of unmeritorious parties. Substantive legal issues were raised in many of
the cases stated 44 and arbitrators' decisions were often reversed.45 Injustice would thus have resulted without the judicial review afforded by
the case stated procedure. Also, judges frequently disagreed about the
legal issues presented in cases stated 4 Disagreement among panel
judges assigned to a case and among judges in different levels of the
court system points out that the issues presented were not necessarily
trivial 7 This review of cases stated during the past twenty years shows
that the procedure played a positive role in the law.
The parliamentary debate on the Act reveals that its architects were
concerned with commercial as well as legal considerations. The Act
was in part viewed as a means of increasing London's importance as a
situs for transnational arbitration. Lord Hacking, for example, recounted
that, during his years of legal practice in New York, parties to international contracts were often discouraged from choosing London as
the situs for arbitration because of the case stated procedure.4 8 Another
43- Fifty-two cases stated between i96o and 1979 were reviewed. Survey results are
presented in the Annex, infra. The survey was limited to cases reported in the All England
Law Reports. Although it thus excludes cases settled, not reported, or reported elsewhere,
the survey presents a cross section of the types of cases stated and their disposition, and
thus provides a useful alternative to the anecdotal criticisms discussed in the text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
44. The following cases illustrate the types of substantive legal issues raised in statements of the case: Services Europe Atlantique Sud v. Stockholm Rederiaktiebolag, ['979]
1 All E.R. 421 (H.L.) (choice of currency for the award); Timber Shipping Co. v. London
& Overseas Freighters, Ltd., [1972] A.C. i (statutory interest rate); Compagnie d'Armement Maritime v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation, [1971] A.C. 572 (choice of law);
Ismail v. Polish Ocean Lines, [1976] 1 Q.B. 893 (C.A.) (equitable estoppel); Maredelanto Compania Naviera v. Bergbau-Handel GmbH, [197o] 3 All E.R. 125 (C.A.)
(force majeure); President of India v. Metcalfe Shipping Co., [1969] 3 W.L.R. i12o
(CA.) (scope of arbitral jurisdiction); Surrendra Overseas Ltd. v. Government of Sri
Lanka, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 565 (Q.B.) (statute of limitations); Government of Ceylon v.
Chandris, [1963] 2 Q.B. 327 (excessive arbitration fees).
45. The High Court overturned the arbitrator's decision in 21 of -the 54 cases reviewed.
Annex infra.
46. A higher court reversed a lower court's decision in 2o of the 54 cases reviewed. Id.
47. Although not insignificant, the time taken in stating the case was not excessive. The
shortest period of time between an arbitrator's statement of the case and the final decision,
in the cases surveyed, was two months; the longest period was forty-two months; and the
average period was sixteen months. Id.
48. 392 PAtL. DEB., supra note 3, at 89-95. Lord Hacking contemplated in particular
the joint ventures negotiated with Third World governments, such as agreements to build
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noble Lord, Cullen of Ashborne, ventured an estimate that a new
arbitration law might attract to England as much as £500 million per
year of "invisible exports," in the form of fees for arbitrators, barristers,
solicitors, and expert witnesses."0 The most frank statement of the reform's utility as a device for marketing London as a situs for arbitration
was made by Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, a patent barrister, who stated:
0
"[T]he main object of this Bill is to attract arbitration to London." 6
In July 1978, the Commercial Court Committee of the High Court"'
recommended specific reforms52 which formed the basis of the new
legislation. These recommendations resulted in the Arbitration Act of
1979, which was enacted on April 4, I979, 53 and became effective for all

arbitrations commencing on or after August x of that year."
JudicialReview in Retreat: The 1979 Act

Abolition of the Special Case
The 1979 Act abolished the special case procedure, both as "alternative
awards" and the "consultative case," along with the common law
jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside or remit an award for error
of law on its face. 55 It replaced the procedure with a new right of appeal
factories, airports, or harbors, or to exploit mineral and petroleum resources. Third world
governments often seek arbitration for the resolution of disputes to avoid submitting to
the jurisdiction of a foreign national court. See text accompanying note ig infra. The
same point had been raised two and one-half months earlier in Lord Diplock's Alexander
Lecture, supranote 3.
49. 392 PAi.,. DEB., supra note 3, at 99. The Lord Chancellor later erroneously refers
to Lord Cockfield as the source of this figure. Id. at 1x3. This figure was noted in the
COMMERCIAL COuRT REPORT, supra note 3, at 750. 398 PAs.. DEB., supra note 3, at 536. Lord Lloyd later emphasized that "[t]he
problem [sought to be solved by the Act] is essentially a marketing problem." Id. at 541.
See also the remarks of the Lord Chancellor in 397 PA.u.. DEB., supra note 3, at 441: "It
is important that the City of London. . . not be hampered in the maintenance and expansion of [its] important and historical role in arbitration matters."
51. The Commercial Court was set up by the Administration of Justice Act, 1970, C, 31,
§ 3. Before the Act, the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court had a Commercial List
of cases, which were habitually taken by Queen's Bench Judges who by virtue of their
commercial practices at the Bar were earmarked by the Lord Chancellor for that purpose.
Whereas there was originally only one judge hearing cases in the Commercial List, there
are now six judges and by 1970 it was thought appropriate to give this class of work the
dignity of its own court.
52. CoMmERCIAL COURT REPORT, .upra note 3.
53. Act, supra note 3.
54- STAT. INST. No. 750 (1979). Although it does not apply to arbitrations "commenced" prior to August 1, 1979, the Act does retroactively validate "exclusion agreements" prior to that date. Id.
55. Act, supra note 3, § x).
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to the High Court,"' and provided for judicial determination of
questions of law which arise during the proceedings. 7 Unlike statement of a case, the new right of appeal and the right to request interlocutory court assistance are limited. Appeal may be made only with
consent of the opposing party5s or with leave of the court.5" The appeal
will only be granted if the determination of the legal question "could
substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties." 6 0 This
test is more limited than that of Lysland, which permitted appeal on
any point of law necessary to the proper determination of the dispute.'The court may condition its leave to appeal. For instance, it may
require an appealing defendant to provide security for enforcement of
the award. 2 The High Court may order an arbitrator to state reasons
for an award, provided that a party requested a reasoned award before
the decision was made, or that there are "special reasons" why such a
request was not made.6 3 The Act does not define "special reasons."
Awards may still be challenged by allegations of fraud between the
parties64 or of arbitrator "misconduct." 65 However, a question of law
cannot be referred to the Court during the proceedings unless the
arbitrator or all parties agree,66 and the court decides that the interlocutory determination would result in "substantial savings in cost." 'T
The High Court decision may be taken to the Court of Appeal only
if the High Court has certified a matter to be of "general public
importance." 68
Exclusion of Judicial Review of Transnational Arbitration
The Act's most significant provision gives parties the right to enter
into an "exclusion agreement": a written agreement excluding the right
56. Id.§ 1 (2).
57. Id.§ 2).
58. Id.§ z(3)(a).
59. Id. X(3)(b).
6o. Id.§ 1(4).
6i. [1973) Q.B. at 868.
62. Act, supra note 3, § 1(4)63. Id.§ 1(5)-(6).
64. Arbitration Act, ig5o, supra note 18, § 24(2). ,Under the 1979 Act, the Court may
not decide questions of interparty fraud if they are subject to an exclusion agreement. Act,
supra note 3, § 3(3). Questions of arbitrator impartiality remain subject to judicial determination in all cases. Arbitration Act, 1950, supra, § 24(I).
65. Arbitration Act, 1950, supra note 18, § 23.
66. Act, supra note 3, § 2(1).

67. Id.§ 2(2)(a).
68. Id. ' (7).
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of appeal." Although judicial review may always be excluded after
arbitration has begun,'7 ° the right to "contract out" of judicial review of
future disputes, by appeal or by interlocutory applications, is reserved
for parties to certain international agreements. 7' Parliament intended to
favor primarily the so-called "one-off supra-national development contract," negotiated on an ad hoc basis between a private enterprise and a
developing state. 72 The term "one-off" denotes agreements drafted for
one transaction only, as opposed to standard form agreements used
for multiple, similar transactions.73 Because the terms of "one-off" contracts, including exclusion agreements, are presumably negotiated at
arm's length by parties with relatively equal bargaining power, a nonwaivable right to judicial review was not necessary to protect the parties.
Lord Diplock proposed that international agreements, for which exclusion terms would be enforced, be defined as having been "negotiated"
among parties with "market-place competitors." 74 The Act's sponsors,
however, had difficulty articulating a definition which included such
criteria. The classification was finally defined negatively, by specifically
disallowing the right to contract out of review in maritime, insurance,
and commodities agreements; agreements which were normally made
on standard forms.
The international character of a contract was also defined negatively
as any contract which was not "domestic," that is, one to which neither:
(a) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in,
any State other than the United Kingdom, nor
(b) a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central
management and control is exercised in, any State other than
the United Kingdom, is a party at the time the arbitration
agreement is entered into. 75
Thus, if either party is a foreign resident, the arbitration agreement
would be classified as international.
69. Id. § 3. The issue of fraud between the parties may be excluded. Id. § 3(3).
70. Id. § 3 (6).
71. Id. § 3(6)-(7).
72. See the Lord Chancellor's statements in 397 PARS.. DEB., supra note 3, at 438-39;
CovmiERciAL. COURT REPORT, supra note 3, at 773. The term "one-off" was used by Lord Diplock in The Alexander Lecture, fupra
note 3, at 112, to refer to an agrcement negotiated ad hoc, as opposed to a standard form
agreement.
74. Id. at 115.
75. Act, supra note 3, § 3(7). Because the relevant moment is when the agreement was
entered into, an exclusion agreement will not subsequently become invalid because one of
the parties becomes connected with the United Kingdom later. Id.
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In domestic disputes, such as those where both parties are British or
7
are companies controlled by resident British boards of directors, " an
exclusion agreement may be entered into only after the arbitration has
begun. " Although the Act applies only to arbitration taking place in
England and Wales, 78 it protects "domestic" agreements entered into by
7
Scots and Northern Irish, in Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well
80
The Lords were reluctant to permit "ouster" of the judiciary's supervisory jurisdiction in domestic disputes because they were concerned
that the exclusion agreements might not be genuinely voluntary. 8 '
In order to give English courts greater scope in protecting British
parties, a more sophisticated characterization of an "international"
arbitral agreement might have been provided. Such a characterization
could have been made according to the basic nature of the underlying
transaction, rather than merely the nationality of 'the parties. Consideration of the negotiation's location and subject matter would bring
English concepts of the "international contract" into line with those of
its principal trading partners.8 2
When the subject matter of an arbitration falls into a statutorily
defined "special category," the furthering of arbitrator autonomy encounters competing policies. Exclusion agreements are not permitted
76. The English test for corporate nationality emphasizes the place where management
functions are exercised, rather than the simpler American "place of incorporation" rule.
See De Beers Consol. Mines Ltd. v. Howe, [i9o6] A.C. 455; Income and Corporation
Taxes Act, 1975, ch. 1o, § 482(7); L. GowER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW
207-08 (3d ed. 1970). The "management and control" of a company are generally determined by the place where the board meets (De Beers Consol. Mines), although a company
may also be domiciled where the "housekeeping" or "real business" is done. Swedish
Cent. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, [1925] A.C. 495, 501. For a general discussion of the various
tests of corporate nationality, see Park, Fiscal Jurisdiction and Accrual Basis Taxation:
Lifting the Corporate Veil to Tax Foreign Company Profits, 78 COLum. L. REv. 16o9,
1638-40 (1978).
77. Act, supra note 3, § 3(6).
78. Id. § 8(4).
79. Id. § 3(7).
8o. "Ouster" is the traditional term for "contracting out" or "exclusion." For a history

of the doctrine of ouster, see Schmitthoff, supra note 21, at 294-96.
81. See, e.g., Lord Diplock's statement in 397 PARL. DEB., supra note 3, at 450; ComMERCIAL COURT REPORT, supra note 3, at 12; Diplock, The Alexander Lecture, supra
note 3, at 112. A party with limited bargaining power might be compelled to renounce

protection of the courts under the duress of losing business, or by a fraudulent inducement
to contract. Englishmen who deal with foreigners are, of course, no less in need of such
protection, but Parliament apparently presumed that they were more sophisticated as to
risks inherent in renunciation of the right to judicial review than those who did not deal
with foreigners.
82. See generally Delaume, What is an InternationalContract? An American and Gallic
Dilemma, 28 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 258 (979).
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as to future disputes in shipping," insurance,8 4 or commodities 8 unless

the contract is governed by foreign law,80 questions of which are generally considered to be matters of fact, rather than of law 7 This
limitation was justified on two grounds. First, the Commercial Court
Committee alleged that judicial supervision in these areas had to be
maintained if English law was to remain "the most highly developed
in the world"8 for these types of transnational commercial dealings.
Second, such contracts are usually made on standard forms,8 which
would have aggravated the temptation to impose arbitration without
negotiation.

The Act could be clarified as to what constitutes an exclusion agreement "in writing," particularly in view of parties' common practice

of referring to institutional arbitration rules, such as those of the
International Chamber of Commerce, which exclude judicial review
of awards." Parties who wish to exclude judicial review should be
required to do so expressly, in the arbitration clause, in order to limit
unknowing waiver of rights caused by incorporation of "boilerplate"

arbitration clauses.

1 Such

a rule would be in line with European Court

decisions which require choice of forum clauses to be incorporated into

a contract by express reference.

2

83. Act, supra note 3, § 4(I)(a).
84. Id.§ 4()(b).
85. Id.§ 4(I)(c).
86. Id.§ 4(I)(ii).
87. See A. DICEY & J. MoRsS oN CoNFLicT OF LAws 1124-33 (9th ed. 1973), citing
Ottoman Bank of Nicosia v. Chalarian, [1938] A.C. 26o, 279 (P.C.). Thus, § 4 ()(ii) of
the Act seems merely cosmetic, perhaps the result of a fear that outsiders would not understand English law. See comments by Lord Hacking, 398 PAR.. DEB., supra note 3, at 53741. Presumably questions of English law might arise even if the agreement is governed by
foreign law, e.g., because of renvoi, issues as to the weight of the evidence, or the presumption in favor of English law when no foreign law is proven.
88. CoMMER.cIA CouRT REPO.T, supra note 3, at 12.

89. See comments of Lord Diplock in 397 PAR.L. DEB., supra note 3, at 450-51.
9o. Article 24 of the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conciliation and

Arbitration states: "By submitting the dispute to arbitration by the International Chamber
of Commerce, the parties shall be deemed . . . to have waived their right to any form of
appeal .... " INTENATIONA.

CHAMaR

OF COMMERCE, ICC ARBITmATbON 43 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as ICC GumBE].
91. One sensible, but rejected, suggestion made by Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran was that
no exclusion agreement be valid if in printed form. Parties to exclusion agreements would
have been required to include them in typewritten or holographic form. 397 PARL. Dn.,
supra note 3, at 1221-22 (Jan. z8, 1979).

92. Preliminary Ruling, Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani v. RVA
Polstereimaschinen GmbH, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1831; Preliminary Ruling,
Galeries Segoura SPRL v. Rahim Bonakdarian, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. x85z. These
cases interpreted article 17 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforce-
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What the Act Did Not Cover: Excess of Jurisdiction
The Act's most serious inadequacy is its failure to deal with the critical
relationship between an error of law, which in appropriate cases may
be removed from judicial scrutiny, and arbitrator excess of authority,
which should not be excluded from review. Because arbitration is a
consensual process, an arbitrator can have no more power than that
granted him by the parties. An award that exceeds the arbitrator's grant
of authority should be considered a nullity, and treated as if there had
never been any arbitration settlement at all. While judges in France,9"
the United States,"4 and Scotland 5 have struggled with the thin line
between error of law and excess of authority, English courts have been
able to ignore this difficult jurisdictional issue because the case stated
procedure permitted review of all legal issues. "
The use of exclusion agreements will, in time, force English courts to
struggle with the problem of distinguishing ordinary error from error
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, J.O. Comms. EuR.
(No. L2o4) 28 (1976), 42 Vertrage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (W. Get.), Ser. A,
No. 579; BGBI II 773 In both cases the forum selection clauses, conferring jurisdiction
on German courts, were contained in the seller's general conditions of sale. On accession
to the treaty by Denmark, Ireland, and Great Britain, article 17 was modified to permit
"jurisdiction conferring clauses" in international contracts in a manner recognized by
trade custom. The modified version of the Brussels Convention was signed on Oct. 9,
1978, but was not ratified as of Dec. 31, 1979; the modification was printed in [1978]
O.J. EUR. CoMM. I (No. L 304). On artide 17 of the Brussels Convention, see generally
G. DROZ, COMPETENCE ET EFFETS DES JUGEMENTS DANS LE MARCHi COMMsUN 121-35 (1!972).

93. See discussion in text accompanying notes i8o-82 infra.
94. See discussion accompanying notes 143-47 infra.
95. Mitchell-Gill v. Buchan, [1921] Sess. Cas. 390 (ist Div. Scot.), discussed the distinction between error of law and excess of authority:
Like other judges of more highly specialised qualifications and experience, [the
arbitrator] may err both in interpreting the evidence before him and in applying
the law to the facts which he -thinks are proved; and, -he being the final judge on the
subject-matter of the submission, any such errors and misunderstandings into which
he may innocently fall cannot be corrected. But that is all that is meant by saying
that he is the final judge of fact and law. If it could be proved that, in arriving at his
award, an arbiter had invented the facts to suit some view of his own, or had
fashioned the law to suit his own ideas, then however innocent in itself might be the
eccentricity which had seduced him into such a travesty of judicial conduct, his
behavior would naturally imply that justice had not been done; he would be guilty
of that which Lord Watson in Adams v. Great North of Scot. Ry. Co. described as
misconduct; and his award would be reduced.
Id. at 395.
96. See, e.g., Timber Shipping Co. v. London & Overseas Freighters, Ltd., [1972] A.C. i,
involving the late return of a ship under a charterparty. The arbitrator assessed interest on
payments by the charterer from date of award to payment at twice the then statutory four
percent, clearly an excess of authority. The House of Lords interpreted § 2o of the Arbitration Act, 595o, supra note 18, to prohibit the arbitrator from setting interest at the commercial rate.
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constituting excess of authority. For example, assume that a license
provides for payment of royalties on the first of the year, in default of
which the licensor will have the right to cancel the license. Payment is
late and the license is cancelled. An arbitrator, appointed subject to a
"future disputes" arbitration clause, holds the licensor liable for wrongful termination. Assuming no justification for late payment under the
applicable law, it may be considered that the arbitrator has mistakenly
interpreted the contract. Alternatively, the decision may be considered
to have amended the contract by modifying the payment date. Unless
this latter power was given to the arbitrator by the submission agree.
ment, he has acted beyond his grant of authority.
The 1979 Act did not explicitly consider whether courts have jurisdiction over excess of arbitral authority. Thoughtful judges may interpret
the catch-all prohibition of arbitrator "misconduct" of the Arbitration
Act of I95o 7 as granting jurisdiction to review arbitral proceedings for
arbitrator excess of authority. Lord Hacking, concerned that prohibition
of arbitrator "misconduct" might permit judicial intervention even
after abolition of the case stated procedure, proposed to allow exclusion
agreements to be made expressly applicable to allegations of arbitrator
misconduct, except in cases of dishonesty, breach of "natural justice"
(the English term for due process), and excess of authority."
Recent developments in English administrative law"0 show that Lord
Hacking's concern was not unwarranted. In two recent cases, °0 English
judges evaded the most unequivocal Parliamentary prohibitions on
review of ministerial and lower court decisions ("ouster clauses") by
deeming errors of contract interpretation to constitute excess of authority.
"Ouster clauses" that have been set aside include: (i) "The determination by the [Foreign Compensation] Commission of any application
made to them ...shall not be called in question in any court of
law." 101; and (2) "[N]o judgment [of the County Court] shall be
97. Arbitration Act, x95o,supra note 18, § 23.
98. 397 PARL.DEB., supra note 3, at 1214-15; 398 PAR'.. DEB., supra note 3, at 55o-51.
Lord Justice Donaldson has suggested that exclusion agreements should and do cover
excess of authority as well as error of law. Address by Lord justice Donaldson, Lloyd's
Second Annual International Arbitration Forum, New York, (Nov. 29-30, 1979).
99. On judicial supervision of administrative decisions in England, see generally K.
SmrrH & D. KEENAN, ENGLISH LAW 77-83 (6th ed. 1979).

ioo. Anisminic, Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Comm., [1969] 2 A.C. 147; Pearlman
v. Keepers & Governors of Harrow School, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736 (C.A.).
oz. The Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 12, § 4W,died in Anisminic,
Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Comm., [1969] 2 A.C. 147, 224.
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removed by appeal, motion, certiorari or otherwise into any other court
whatever .... , 102
The first ouster clause was given short shrift by the House of Lords
in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission l o' a case
dealing with a compensation claim for manganese mines lost during the
1956 Suez crisis. Proof that the claimant and any successors in title were
British nationals was a prerequisite for compensation. The Foreign
Compensation Commission returned a negative finding on this point.
Lord Pearce declared the Commission's decision a nullity, saying,
"[W]hile engaged on a proper inquiry, the tribunal ... may ask itself
the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was
not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its
jurisdiction [and] would cause its purported decision to be a nullity."' 104
Lord Denning refused to give effect to the other ouster clause in the
case of Pearlman v. Keepers & Governors of Harrow School, 0 5 where

a tenant sought the right to purchase his house under the Leasehold
Reform Act of 1967. The right to purchase existed only for dwellings
with a taxable value falling below a statutory ceiling which varied
according to the "structural alterations" made by the tenant. Mr. Pearlman claimed that a new central heating system was just such a "structural alteration." The County Court determined that it was not. The
Court of Appeals reversed the County Court, with words by Lord
Denning that bear directly on the fate of exclusion agreements under
the 1979 Act.
[T]he distinction between an error which entails absence of jurisdiction - and an error made within the jurisdiction - is very fine.

So fine indeed that it is rapidly being eroded. Take this very case.
When the judge held that the installation of a full central heating
system was not a "structural alteration ...

or addition" we all

think that he went wrong in point of law. He misconstrued those
words. That error can be described on the one hand as an error
which went to his jurisdiction. In this way: If he had held that it
was a "structural alteration ...

or addition" he would have had

jurisdiction to go on and determine the various matters set out in
102. The County Courts Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, C. 22, § 1o7, cited in Pearlman v.
Keepers & Governors of Harrow School, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736, 742-43 (CA.).
103. [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
104. Id. at 195.
05. [1978) 3 W.L.R. 736 (CA.).

104
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[the statute]. By holding that it was not a "structural alteration...
or addition" he deprived himself of jurisdiction to determine those
matters.1 06

Although the Act stipulates that parties can, by contract, exclude
judicial review of the merits of an arbitration, these cases indicate that
one cannot be assured that British courts will not review the proceedings
despite such clauses. The courts are clearly willing to examine closely
whether a decision maker, such as an arbitrator, is acting within the
scope of his jurisdiction. Thus, although 'the x979 Act may make English
courts less eager to interfere on behalf of foreign parties, particularly if
foreign law is applicable, until rules are developed to distinguish mere
error of law from excess of authority, judicial review of arbitration in
England faces an uncertain fate.
Perhaps Parliament could more effectively have curbed abuse of the
case stated procedure with less drastic measures, such as reversing
Lysland, °7 thereby giving an arbitrator discretion to refuse requests
for judicial assistance. Statement of cases to the High Court might also
have been discouraged if the party requesting review had been required
to bear the expenses of appeal, including attorneys' fees, in the event
that the court came to the same conclusion as the arbitrator' 0 A more
comprehensive evaluation of the Act's merits should be made in light
of other states' scope of review and in light of the function of the
international arbitral process.
THE SCOPE OF ARBITRATOR AUTONOMY IN
MAJOR NON-ENGLISH ARBITRATION CENTERS
Approaches to arbitrator error fall into three categories: (i) interventionist, in Zurich and Geneva, where the judiciary may re-examine the
merits of the dispute; (2) laissez-faire,in the Netherlands, Sweden and
the United States, where error qua error is not subject to review;
and (3) optional, in France, where parties may choose whether or not
to prohibit appeal on the merits.
io6. Id. at 743-44.
107. [r973) 1 Q.B. 843. See discussion in text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
1o8. A proposal in this vein was made by Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran on Feb. 5, 1979.
His proposed amendment would have required payment of security equal to the amount of
the award. 398 PAR.. DEB., supra note 3, at 529. Unfortunately, Lord Diplock's retort, id.
at 530, ("to require [the plaintiff] to pay into court the money he is claiming will not
work") ended what might have been a fruitful exploration of monetary sanctions.
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The Laissez-faireStates

Sweden 'o9
The recently amended Swedish Arbitration Act 1 ° distinguishes between awards which are void and those which are merely challengeable.
The award will be void on the obvious ground that a valid arbitration
agreement was lacking,"' because of non-arbitral subject matter,"' or
pending litigation,"13 or because it was not in writing and signed by
the majority of arbitrators." 4 The grounds for challenge,"- 5 which may
be contractually renounced, include excess of authority (in certain
circumstances)," 0 lapse of the agreement to arbitrate before the award
3o9. On U.S.-U.S.S.R. arbitration in Stockholm, see Holtzmann, Dispute Resolution
Procedures in East-West Trade, 13 INT'L LAW. 233 (1979). On the UNCITRAL Rules,
see generally Symposium on Unification of International Trade Law: UNCITRAL's First
Decade, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 203, 449-506 (i979). The UNCITRAL Rules may be
found in id. at 489.
xio. Lag om skiljem~n, 1929 No. 145, as amended, with effect from July 1, 1976
[hereinafter cited as L.O.S.]. An English translation appears in STOCKHOLM CHAMBER oF
COMMEMCE, ARBTRATION IN SWEDEN 392-201 (977). On judicial review in Sweden, see
generally Hierner, Recourse to Law Courts in International Arbitration in Sweden, in
HOMMAGE A FREDiRIC EISEMANN, supra note 32, at 61--75.
xII.

L.O.S., supra note I o, § 20.

132. Id. Installment sales (or what the English would call a "hire-purchase" contract)
are one example of nonarbitral subject matter in Sweden. As.ta'ATioN IN SWEDEN, supra
note 1o, at 33.
113. L.O.S., supra note Iio,§§ ,20.
334. Id. § 20. The Arbitration Act also refers to awards too "obscure," i.e., incomplete

or unclear, to permit enforcement. A finding of obscurity must be made by the Overexekutor, or Chief Execution Authority, and is subject to judicial review. Awards lacking
calculations or measurements have been held to be "obscure." See ARBITRATION IN
SWEDEN, supra note iio, at 152-53. The definition of obscurity is itself obscure, and it is
far from clear what awards are unenforceable on this ground. An interesting question
might thus arise if an award were refused enforcement under the New York Convention,
supra note 9, as "not binding" by reason of obscurity. Presumably, it would be necessary
to have a determination of "obscurity" by the Overexekutor. See Sjogren v. Ostra Centralbanas Jarnvags AB, [39o6] Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 1, at 345 (railroad construction; Overexekutor found obscurity in failure to indicate party to perform additional work; reversed
by Swedish Supreme Court); Hedberg v. Asbacka Travaru AB [1929] Nytt Juridiskt
Arkiv I, at 77 (purchase of lumber found to be of less than contract quality; arbitration
failed to distinguish between executory and non-executory part of contract; pro rata allocation made by Supreme Court). Both cases are discussed in A.BrrATIoN IN SWEDEN,
supra note 11o, at 353-54.
xi5. "Challengeable" awards may be upset (but not revised or remitted to the arbitrator) within sixty days from the date when the award is received by the challenging

party, after which it is binding. L.O.S., supra note 3io, § 23.
116. L.O.S., supra note iio, § 21. But Hjerner, supra note Iao, at 72, suggests that
waiver of the right to challenge for excess of authority is valid only if the issue may be
raised in another forum, such as the court in which enforcement of the award is sought.
A party may waive the right to challenge an award expressly, or impliedly, by participation
in the irregular proceedings without objection. AlRtT.rs'oN iN SWEDEN, supra note 1ao,
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was made," 7 failure to respect venue requirements,"' arbitrator partiality,"' 9 improper appointment of an arbitrator, 20 and "procedural
irregularity" that may have materially affected the outcome of the
arbitration.121 The only distinction made between domestic and international awards, i.e., where one of -the parties resides outside Sweden,
is that the latter are exempt from the usual six-month limit for the
22
rendering of the award.
The Netherlands

123

Although best known as a locus for resolution of public conflicts, the
non-interventionist nature of The Hague's courts has made it increasingly attractive as a place for commercial dispute resolution. Dutch law
distinguishes "true" arbitration of existing disputes (akte van compromis)' 24 and future disputes (compromissoir beding),125 from settlement by "binding recommendation" (bindend advies). When parties
have provided for either of the two types of "true" arbitration, Dutch
courts are limited on review to considering whether the controversy
was in fact subject to the authority of the arbitrator pursuant to a valid
submission agreement 2 Recognition (exequatur) of the award cannot
1 27
be refused merely because of arbitrator error.

at 167. Void awards, of course, remain so despite an agreement by the parties to the contrary. L.O.S., supra note I o, § 20.
117. L.O.S., supra note irxo, § 2r(7); see ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note zio, at
156.
xi8. L.O.S., supra note 1Io, § 21(2) (the agreement indicated a non-Swedish venue for
arbitration).
rig. L.O.S., supra note rio, § 20 refers to "disqualification" of a partial arbitrator,
pursuant to § 5.
120. Id. § 21(3); see ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note rio, at z58.
121. L.O.S., supra note rio, § 21(4).
722. Id. § I8.

123. Dutch statutory law on judicial review of arbitration is found in §§ 620-57 of the
Dutch code of civil procedure, the Wetboek van bturgerlile Rechtsvordering. Because there
is no English, French, or German translation of the statute or relevant cases, the references
in this article are made to the English language summary in Stein, Civil Procedure, in
INTRODUCTION To DUTCH LAw PoR FOREIGN LAWYE S 231, 255-56 (D. Fokkema, J.
Chorus, E. Hondius, E. Lisser eds. 1978).
124. Stein, supra note 123, at 255.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 256.
127. Id. If the parties have submitted to bindend advies the scope of judicial review is
substantially wider. While the court may not disregard the bindend advies merely because
it would have come to a different conclusion, the award may be set aside as manifestly
"unreasonable."
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The United States
Arbitrator error, as such, is not subject to judicial attack in the United
States 28 The validity of an award will depend on the fairness of the
proceedings, the subject matter, and the scope of the arbitration agreement, but not on the correctness of the arbitrator's findings of law or
fact' 2 Few litigants or judges, however, are so unsophisticated as to
mount a frontal assault on arbitrator error. The validity of awards has
usually been challenged on grounds that the arbitrator exceeded the
scope of his authority. Thus, state and federal courts struggle with
the line between mere error of law and excess of arbitral jurisdiction.
All states have enacted arbitration statutes to supplement or implement the common law. 3 ' Although international -transactions will
be subject to federal law, a state court does have power to enforce
an international agreement to be performed within state borders,' 31 and
the validity of the contract by which the parties submit to arbitration
may be determined by local contract law. 32 The Uniform Arbitration
Act, now adopted by nineteen states,13 3 generally mirrors federal grounds
128. Nor will a court, except to remove an arbitrator who has engaged in misconduct
or to attach assets, intervene prior to the rendering of the award. See Dover S.S. Co., x43
F. Supp. 738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). To encourage arbitrators to serve and to act freely,
an arbitrator is immune from civil, although not criminal, liability for failure to act with
care in the exercise of his function. See Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ohio
1967); Friedman, CorrectingArbitrator Error: The Limited Scope of Judicial Review, 33
Alm. J. 9 (Dec. 3978); Glick, Bias, Fraud, Misconduct and Partiality of the Arbitrator,
22 Asa. J. 16r (1967). On judicial review in the United States, see generally Jalet, Judicial
Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (i96o); Kronstein,
Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 661 (1963); Yarowsky, judicial Deference
to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A.
L. Rav. 936 (3976); Comment, Commercial Arbitration Under the Federal Act: Expanding the Scope of judicial Review, 35 Pr-r. L. REv. 799 (974).
329. These points are discussed in this section, infra.
130. 16 WLisTON ON CoTrrAcTs § 192B, at 338-40 (W. Jaeger ed. 3976).
131. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (3924).
132. In an interstate transaction, the validity of the arbitration clause will generally be
severable from the validity of the contract. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (3967) (consulting agreement executed in connection with sale of paint
business; on insolvency of seller/consultant, buyer alleged breach in the inducement to
contract by fraudulent representation of solvency). Thus the arbitrator may determine
even questions of fraudulent misrepresentation so long as they do not touch the submission agreement. For a survey of "severability" in Europe, see 2 G. DELA ME, supra
note 12, § 33.o6, at 37. For a case where, under state law, implied rescission of a contract
was held to constitute abandonment of the quasi-arbitration as well, see Mendez v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 362 Mass. 353, 285 N.E.2d 446 (1972) (willful absence of nursing
instructor constituted breach and abandonment of contract, thus making faculty termination grievance procedures inapplicable).
133. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
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for vacating an award, 834 as do statutes in New York'3 8 and California, 136 the preeminent states of international commerce. Under this
approach, the award will be vacated only where it was procured by
fraud, violates public policy, or where -the arbitrator exceeded his
authority, displayed partiality, or conducted the hearings so as to
37
prejudice the parties' rights
Federal grounds for vacating an arbitral award under the United
States Arbitration Act' 8 fall into two general categories: (i) violation
of procedural fairness; and (2) excess of arbitral authority.3 Unlike
the Uniform Arbitration Act, contravention of public policy is not an
enumerated ground on which an award may be declared invalid. The
first class of defenses, relating to lack of procedural fairness, includes
common law barriers to enforceability such as procurement of the
award by fraud, corruption, or undue means, 140 and arbitrator partiality
or corruption.' 41 Also included is misconduct of the proceedings so as
to prejudice a party's rights, such as refusal to postpone hearings,
42
receive pertinent evidence or make a final and definite award.
The other grounds for vacating an award relate to arbitrator excess of
South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. x6 WmLs'roN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 130,
1921B, at 338-40.
134. UNiFORm ARBITRATION ACT art. 12 stipulates:

§

(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award if:
(I) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, or corruption in any of the arbitrators, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being
shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so
conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section five, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) there was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined
in proceedings under section two and the party did not participate in the arbitration
hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the relief was such that it
could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for
vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
Compare this Act with the discussion of federal law in text accompanying notes 138-55

infra.
I35. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 7511(b) (McKinney x963).
136. CAL. Civ. PRoc. LAw § 1286.2 (West 1972).
I37. See note 134 supra.
138. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-1o (1976).
139. See generally Aksen, The Case for the Status Quo, 18 ID A 81 (1976); Friedman,
Correcting Arbitrator Error: The Limited Scope of Judicial Review, 33 ARB. J. 9 (Dec.
1978); Yarowsky, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of
Power and Finality, 23"U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 936 (1975).
140- 9 U.S.C. § io(a) (1976).
141. Id. § io(b).
142. Id. § io(c).
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authority, often difficult to distinguish from mere unreviewable error
of law. A court may not, under the guise of determining whether a
particular issue was in fact committed to an arbitrator, consider the
143
substance of the arbitrator's exercise of his legitimate authority.
When the arbitrator's misinterpretation of the contract is so gross as to
constitute a modification of the contract, however, the court may vacate
the award as outside the express or implied mission given him by the
parties. 44 The United States Supreme Court has referred -to error
amounting to excess of authority as "manifest disregard of the law." 141
Although an award may be "clearly erroneous" without constituting
manifest disregard of the law, 146 the arbitrator will have exceeded his
authority if he understood the law, yet intentionally ignored it, even if
47
pursuing his own concept of justice.'
Finally, an arbitration agreement may be invalid because of the "nonarbitrability" of the subject matter,'48 including antitrust, 4 patent
infringement, 150 and security violations. ' " The implications to society
of these questions are deemed too great to permit ouster of judicial
jurisdiction.
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver,1 2 the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the special need of international commerce for neutrality
143. In the so-called Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court ended judicial decision
on the merits under the guise of determining "arbitrability." The Trilogy included United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (i96o);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (ig6o); United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (i96o).
144. Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1972) (arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association of a dispute arising out of
the acquisition of stock of companies that manufactured and financed prefabricated houses;
arbitrator's award of $6 million to cover tax liabilities of purchased companies held in
excess of authority). See Electronics Corp. of America v. Int'l Union of Elec. Radio, &
Mach. Workers Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255 (ist Cir. 1974) (reversing award based on
factual error).
145. Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 0953).
146. See I/S Stavburg v. National Metal Convertors, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir.
1974); San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Sagvenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796
( 9 th Cir. 1963).
147. See, e.g., Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 3125 (3972). See also
Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1323 (3d Cir. 1969).
148. See i6 WmLn"roN oN CoNTRACTs, supra note 330, § 1922C, at 517-54. Wilko v.
Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (X953).
149. See cases cited in WiLusToN oN CONTRACTS, supra note 130, § 1922C, at 520-27.
35o. Id. at 527-54.
151. Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
152. 417 U.S. 5o6 (3974). See generally Note, InternationalArbitration-Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Laws Denied, i6 HARV. INT'L L.J. 705
(1975).
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of forum might justify a wider scope of arbitrability than allowed in
purely domestic agreements. A United States enterprise had purchased
from a German citizen three cosmetics companies organized in Germany
and Liechtenstein. Despite an agreement that any disputes arising out of
-theacquisition should be arbitrated in Paris according to the rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce, the buyer commenced an action
for violations under section xo(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. 3 The
District Court and the Court of Appeals enjoined the arbitration based
on Wilko v. Swann,1 4 a 1953 Supreme Court case which had held
securities laws violations non-arbitrable. Finding that the needs of
transnational commerce might override the policies behind the securities
laws, the Supreme Court reversed. Citing the need for certainty in
choosing a forum for the settlement of international disputes, the Court
stated:
Uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive
laws and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision specifying
in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the
law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential
to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a
provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the agreement
might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the
parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.'
Interventionism in Switzerland: Zurich and Geneva0 0
In Switzerland, arbitration agreements are considered contracts of
153. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (976).
154. 346 U.S. 427 (1953)155. 417 U.S. at 517. On forum selection clauses in transnational commerce, see

Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See alo Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Soci&t Generale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d
Cir. 1974), where a more benevolent attitude was likewise taken toward arbitration of
transnational disputes. A United States company had contracted to build and manage a
paperboard mill in Alexandria, Egypt. The construction was interrupted in 1967 by the
Arab-Israeli Six Day War. The company claimed force majeure as a defense to continuing
the work after the end of the War, and contested the $342,000 award in favor of the
Egyptians. Among the defenses raised to enforcement of the award was the "nonarbitrability" of the foreign policy issues. Although it found the subject matter arbitrable as to
domestic or international cases, the court stated that "[t]he special considerations and
policies underlying a 'truly international agreement' call for a narrower view of nonarbitrability in the international than the domestic context." Id. at 975.
156. On arbitration in Switzerland, see generally Briner, Switzerland, in 3 YEARBOOK:
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 12, at 181; Reymond, The New Swiss Uniform
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a procedural nature, and thus are governed by cantonal law' 57 As
part of their codes of civil procedure, all cantons have enacted legislation
governing arbitration proceedings. A decade ago, a movement to unify
twenty-five separate systems of arbitration resulted in a uniform arbitration law (ConcordatSuisse Sur l'Arbitrage), "5 which sixteen cantons
have enacted.'5 9 Zurich, the most important abstainer, has resisted the
trend toward uniformity' 0 As a result, different systems of procedure
govern arbitration in the two leading Swiss centers, Zurich and
Geneva.' 01
Statutory provisions in both Zurich and Geneva essentially permit
an award to be challenged for arbitrator error of law. Zurich 62 provides
Arbitration Act and InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 85
(,977).
157. Bundesverfassung [B.V.] art. 3 (Switz), Constitution federale [Csr.] art. 3, Constituzione federale [CoST. FaD.] art. 3; id. art. 1, para. 3.
158. CoMITE SUISSE DE L'AsarrRtAo,, CONCORDAT Suissa su, L'ARBITRAGE (974)
(Text of Concordat in French, German, Italian, and English with notes in French,
German, and English by Andre Panchand) [hereinafter cited as CONCORDAT]. Under
Swiss law, a concordat is an intercantonal treaty and may not be varied by the individual
ratifying cantons. Schweizerisches Obligationsrecht [OR] art. 84 (Switz.), Code des
Obligations [C.O.] art. 84, Codicedella obligazione [Con. OaL.] art. 84. The interpretation
of the Concordaes terms, of course, will depend on cantonal courts.
159. As of June i, 1977: Bern, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Fribourg, Solothurn,
Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen, Graubunden, Ticino, Vaud, Valais,
Neuchatel, and Genve. Briner, supra note 156, at i8r.
x6o. Zurich has chosen instead to retain its own procedure as improved by the thorough
revision of its Code of Civil Procedure, the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), in 1976. Whether
Zurich law represents an approach to arbitration different from the Concordat, supra note
158, is open to question.
161. Both systems provide that a particular cantonal court will designate the arbitrator(s) if the parties cannot agree and no one else is so authorized by the agreement. The
court will be the high civil court of the canton which is the seat of the arbitration. This
court may delegate all duties, with the exception of adjudication of nullification and
revision, to another judicial authority. The Geneva Superior Court has delegated these
duties to the Tribunal de Premi~re Instance. CONCORDAT, supra note 158, arts. 1, 2, 45;
ZPO, supra note 16o, §§ 370, 243. The same court decides challenges to the arbitrators,
CONCORDAT, supra note 158, art. 21; ZPO, supra note i6o, § 244(5), and has authority to
fine them or to revoke their office. CONCORDAT, supra note 158, art. 22; ZPO, supra note
16o, § 245(2). Court assistance is also contemplated by both systems in the production of
evidence. CONCORDAT, supra note 158, art. 27; ZPO, supra note 16o, § 2,51(2). Further,
both provide for court certification of the enforceability of the award. CONCORDAT, supra
note x58, art. 44, para. r;ZPO, supra note 16o, § 257. The award is legally binding and
enforceable as soon as it is rendered and the parties have been notified. Court certification
is an optional, nonadversarial procedure to facilitate enforcement; it will be refused only
for limited grounds. See Briner, supra note 156, at 198-99.
162. Invocation of an arbitration agreement bars an action in the cantonal courts on the
merits of a dispute. This necessarily precludes normal appeal (Beruung) from decisions
of a court of arbitration. In Zurich, an action in Rekurs may be brought in the Zurich
Superior Court; the action suspends arbitration. It may be countered by "Anschlussreklurs"
to answer new factual allegations, objections, and evidence.
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16 4
for challenge 3 by a plea of nullification (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde)
to the extent the award violates an essential rule of procedure, is based
on findings of fact contrary to the record or arbitrary, or clearly violates
clear substantive law."0 5 In Geneva, a plea of nullity is also available 0 0
on grounds essentially the same as in Zurich. The decision may be upset
if it is "arbitrary" (arbitraire), or if it violates principles of law or
equity. 17 Nullification in both Zurich and Geneva thus permits a court
to eliminate gross substantive defects and achieve what, in the court's
eyes, is the correct decision.
The practical impact of the judicial discretion to reverse arbitral
awards will depend in large part on cantonal judicial interpretation of
the content of "arbitrariness." In this respect, a recent decision of the
Geneva cantonal court dealing with a "one-off supra-national contract"
merits special attention. In Societ Entrepose v. SocitS
Tunisienne d' Electricitiet du Gaz,'06 decided on November 8, 1979, a

163. The Zurich Superior Court has jurisdiction; the action must be brought within 30
days after the decision it challenges.
164. Gegen Vor-, Teil- und Endentscheide sowie gegen Rekursentscheide und Rickweisungen im Berufungsverfahren kann Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde erhoben werden, wcnn
geltend gemacht wird, der angefochtene Entscheid beruhe zum Nachtcil des Nichtigkeitsclagers
I. auf der Verletzung eines wesentlichen Verfahrensgrundsatzes,
2. auf einer aktenwidrigen oder willkiirlichen tatsichlichen Annahme oder
3. auf einer Verletzung klaren materiellen Rechts.
ZPO, supra note i6o, § 281.
165. The action does not restrict the legal validity or enforceability of the challenged
decision unless the court provides otherwise. If the decision is wholly or partially quashed,
the Zurich Superior Court may decide the issue itself, if appropriate; otherwise, it will
remand to the tribunal for cure of the defect and a new decision. Zurich civil procedure
bars pleading for nullification against a decision on nullification. ZPO, supra note x6o,
§ 284. A triple attack on a given decision is thus precluded within the canton. A plea for
nullification to the Federal Constitutional Court of Switzerland is always permissible,
however, if the plaintiff alleges a violation of articles 4 or 58 of the Bundesverfassung.
ZPO, supra note i6o, § 258(2). Article 4 guarantees all Swiss citizens equal treatment
before the law; article 58, paragraph x guarantees every individual access to the appropriate
court
I66. CONCORDAT, supra note 158, arts. 36-40.
x67. Id. art. 3 6(f): Lorsque ]a sentence est arbitraire parce qu'elle repose sur des constatations manifestement contraires aux faits risultant du dossier ou parce qu'cllc constitue
une violation 6vidente du droit ou de l'quit6. If there is no remand, or if the arbitrator
fails to amend or complete the award, the cantonal court decides the plea. The award is
quashed to the extent the plea is allowed; the arbitrator must then render a new award; id.
art. 40.
x68. Concerning the "one-off supra-national contract," see notes 72-73 supra and
accompanying text.
i69. Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979, No. 320, Cour de Justice (Republique et Canton de
Geneve) [1979], 3eme section.

198o

/ Judicial Supervision of TransnationalArbitration

113

French company had contracted with a Tunisian state agency to construct a 300 kilometer natural gas pipeline. The French construction
company claimed, and the International Chamber of Commerce arbitrator awarded, damages in the amount of FF4 ,3 21,8 7 4 (approximately
US$i,ooo,ooo) as expenses due to failure of the Tunisian agency to
meet its obligation to supply a floating crane. The court reversed this
portion of the award as "arbitrary" under the Concordat, finding a
violation of a "clear and undisputed legal norm or principle." 170 Determining which party is to supply a floating crane for a construction
project would seem to be the type of issue intended for arbitral decision. However, by finding a misinterpretation of the contract to be
"arbitrary," the Court substituted its own opinion of the merits for
that of the arbitrator.
Federal Constitutional Courts may review cantonal decisions only
1
for alleged violation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.t l
The Federal Court is thus restricted to deciding whether the cantonal
court is itself vulnerable to the charge of arbitrariness as regards its
decision, i.e., whether it performed its supervisory function in a manifestly unjustifiable manner. Execution will also be denied if the debtor
proves that the award violates Swiss public policy.'72

7o. Id., slip op. at 55 (author's translation from the French).
171. OR, art. 84, C.O., art. 84, COD. OBL. art 84, supra note 158.
,72. Briner, supra note 156, at 2oo. A detailed discussion of ordre public is beyond the
scope of this article. The concept is a relative one and case law is limited. An excellent
treatment of the subject concludes that the only general proposition which can be drawn
from ordre public challenges to domestic awards is that the concept includes mandatory,
unwaivable norms of substantive law; which norms are unwaivable remains unsettled.
E. HAYMANN, DER ORDRE PUBLIC IN DER PRIVATN ScsEDSGERicHTBARrEIT 111-13

(1969). Further, the Federal Court of Switzerland has not expressly decided whether
ordre public includes rules of procedure, although denial of execution is justified where
the principles of independence and impartiality have been violated. Id. Review of foreign
awards, where the demand for execution is based on treaties between Switzerland and the
state where the award was rendered, stands on a different footing. All such treaties contain
a clause reserving to Switzerland the right to refuse enforcement where it would violate
ordre public, but the Federal Court has held that the term's application and construction
in this context are far narrower than in domestic legislations. Judgment of Dec. 12, 1975,
Bundesgericht, Switz., [1975] ior BGE I at 521, 526; Judgment of Sept. 20, 1972,
Bundesgericht, Switz., [1972] 98 BGE I at 527, 533; Judgment of Feb. 9, 1977 Obergericht, Zurich, [1977] 103 BGE I at 199, 204. The question is not whether the grounds
of decision offend Swiss ordre public, but whether recognition of the decision leads to
unjustifiable results, ones which "offen[d] the Swiss sense of justice in unendurable
fashion." Judgment of Feb. 2, 1954, Bundesgericht, Switz., [1954] 8o BGE II at 53, 6465. For a comprehensive list of treaties providing for reciprocal enforcement of judgments
to which Switzerland is a party, see Briner, supra note 156, at 204.
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78
France:OptionalReview of Error'

French law distinguishes between an award free from review, and an
arbitrator free from the law. An error of law may be excluded from
review, but an excess of authority will in all cases be subject to judicial
scrutiny. In commercial matters (contracts between merchants),'
future disputes may be submitted to arbitrators who will generally be
judges of their own jurisdiction. 175 All awards are normally appealable
to the appropriate court of appeal (cour d'appel),"'0 but parties may, at
the time of entering into the submission agreement, exclude the court's
appellate jurisdiction. 7 7 Such exclusion has become automatic for international arbitrations held in Paris under the supervision of the Interna7
tional Chamber of Commerce.1'
Despite exclusion of appeal, a party may, by plea of nullity (opposition en nullit), raise five statutory bases from which to challenge an
award. 79 Two of the challenges overlap to form the objection that an
arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority, either by making an
award outside the terms of the submission agreement (hors des terines
173. On the law of arbitration in France, see generally P. FOUCHAxo,
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (x965); J. ROBERT, A

L'ABITsA^E

Civu. ET COIMMERCIAL (x967);
rrnRaCoE

Bredin, The Paralysis of Foreign Arbitral Awards through the Abuse of Remedies, 89 J.
DR.INT'L 639 (r962).
174. C. coat. art. 631 (Fr.). Limitation of arbitration only to commercial matters has

been less strictly applied in international cases. See Judgment of Jan. 27, 1957, Cour
d'Appel, Paris, [957] J.C.P. II at ro65.
x75. On the Continental doctrine of compitence-compltence, or Kompetenz.-Konpetenz,
see 2 G. DELAuE , supra note 12, § 13.o6, at 4o; Sanders, L'Autonomie de la Clause
Compromissoire,in HOMMAGE A FREDERIC EISEMANN, supra note 12, at 34-35.
176. C. PR. cirv. art. 1023 (Fr.). Prior to 1975, it was uncertain whether the appeal

would be taken to the cour d'appel or to the tribunal de grande instance (court of general
jurisdiction). See generally J. ROBERT, supra note 173, at 295-97.
177. C. PR. cIV. art. ioio (Fr.).

X78. The exclusion of judicial review has become part of the "boilerplate" for many
international arbitrations held in Paris by virtue of reference in the compromis to article 24
of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration. See note 9o supra.
179. C. PR. crv. art. io28 (Fr.):

II ne sera besoin de se pourvoir par appel ni recours en r~vision dans lescas suivants:
(i)Si le jugement a &4 rendu sans compromis, ou hors des termes du compromis;
(2) S'il l'a &h sur compromis nul ou expire;
(3)S'il n'a &6 rendu que par quclques arbitres non autorisds a juger en l'absence des
autres;
(4)S'il l'a & par un tiers sans en avoir conf&6 avec les arbitres partagcs;
(5) En fin, s'il a & prononc6 sur choses non demand&s.
The nullity of the award is considered a matter of ordre public, and review of the
statutory grounds for voidness is not excludable by contract. See A.D.C. v. S.C.E.L.,
Judgment of Feb. 4, 1966, Cour d'Appel, Paris [1966], reprinted in 1966 Ravur Di.
L'ARBiTRAGE 27 (discussed at note 182 infra).
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du compromis)"8 ° or by deciding issues not submitted for arbitration
8
(s'il a t prononc sur choses non demanddes). ' The fine line between
error of law and excess of authority is drawn by reference to the intent
of the arbitrator when he made the erroneous award.'" An arbitrator
who is found to have purposefully applied a rule of decision or law
other than that chosen by the parties, even if he has done so in a
good faith attempt to provide a more just resolution to the conflict, has
opened his award -to challenge by a plea of nullity.
The dictates of ordre public, which may not be abrogated by contract, restrict arbitrable subject matter' 8 3 The notion of ordre public
is given a more restricted scope in relation to "international" contracts,
however. For example, the prohibition for a state enterprise to enter
into an arbitration agreement does not apply to contracts classified as

"international." " 4 French courts have also permitted arbitration of the
validity of international contracts clearly illegal under French law

s5

THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
ON TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Factors relevant to an evaluation of the degree of judicial review appropriate to transnational arbitrations include arbitration's role in transnational dispute settlement, the interests of the parties and the comi8o. C. sR. civ. art. 1028 (Fr.).
1S.

Id.

182. The case of Agence de Diffusion et de Publicit6 v. Socit Cooperative d'Etudes ct
de Librairie, Judgment of Feb. 4, 1966, supra note 179, decided in 1966 by the Cour
d'Appel of Paris, involved an advertising agency suing for damages from a publisher whose
advertising it had managed. The arbitrator awarded damages ("indemniti de clientele")
according to trade practice rather than law. The court held that, by intentionally ignoring
law in favor of custom, the arbitrator had arrogated to himself the powers of amiable
compositeur (deciding according to the arbitrator's concept of fairness rather than the
law). Since the powers of amiable compositeur had not been granted by the parties,
the arbitrator acted outside the scope of the submission agreement, rendering the award void.
See Mezger, La Distinction entre l'Arbitre dispensi d'observer la Regle de loi et l'Arbitrc
statuant sans appel, in LiBER AmicoRtum FOR MARTIN DosscE, supra note 21, at 184.
183. C. civ. art. 6 (Fr.). See also id., art. 1128. See generally J. ROBERT, supra note 173,

at 44-64.
184. See Tresor Public v. Galakis, Judgment of May 2, 1966, Cass. Paris reprinted in
648. This case involved a dispute arising out of a charter party of the
1966 J. DR.
Greek ship by the French state. A London arbitral award was recognized by an order of
exequatur despite the violation of ordre public constituted by any arbitration clauses
entered into by French state agencies. This decision foreshadowed by eight years that of
the United States Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver CO., 417 U.S. 506 (1974),
discussed in text accompanying note 152 supra.
z85. See Impex v. Malteria, Judgment of May 18, 1971, Cass. civ. ire, France, reprinted

1.

in 1972 J. DR.

INT'L 62. See generally 2 G. DELAUME, supra note 12, § 13.05, at 25-34.
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munities involved, and the judiciary's interest in the integrity of the
award being enforced.
The Role of Arbitrationin TransnationalDispute Settlement
The purported advantages of arbitration -speed, 8 " low cost,'"7 secrecy, 88 procedural simplicity, 8 9 and the technical competence of the
decision maker' 90 - are not always present in international arbitral
practice. Economy of time and money are generally illusory. A brief
examination of the fee schedule of the International Chamber of Commerce 91 leaves no doubt that it can be costly for litigants to pay for
their own adjudicatory apparatus. Long delays may result when a party
refuses to comply promptly with arbitral procedures. The arbitrator
may lack power to compel a defendant to give a timely answer. Delay
may be prolonged where the parties have no ongoing commercial relationship, as between supplier and manufacturer, which would provide
incentive for cooperation in the arbitral process. 9 2 Moreover, resort to
arbitration may deprive the parties of summary procedures available in
the appropriate court, for example, to enforce a promissory note,19 3 or
to enjoin improper use of a license. 19 4 Furthermore, the increasing use of
the "professional" arbitrator, not infrequently a lawyer unfamiliar with
the business practices and terminology in the disputed transaction, 9"
186. 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACT=, supra note 13o, § 1923C, at 738; Pearson, Arbitration and the Business Man, in LIBER AmIcoRUm FoR MARTIN Doms<, supra note 25, at 210.
187. 16 WmLsroN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 130, § 1923C, at 739.
z88. ICC GuIDE, supra note 90, at 7; Address by Charles Torcm, Vice President of the
International Chamber of Commerce, Increasing Need for Effectiveness of International
Commercial Arbitration 35-36, Second Forum on International Arbitration, New York
(Nov. 29-30, 1979).
i89. A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ParVATE TRADE 75-76 (975); McGovern, The
"Case" for Expanded Judicial Review of Com merejal Arbitration Awards, 18 IDEA 67, 70
(conference issue 1977); Pearson, supra note z86, at 2o9-xo; Phillips, The Rules of LaissezFairein Commercial Arbitration 47 HARv. L. REv. 590, 6oi (1934); Totem, supra note
188, at 29-32.
x9o. 16 WiLsxoN ON CoNTRAT s, supra note 130, § 1923C, at 740; Pearson, supra
note x86, at 2xi; Torem, supra note 188, at 33-34.
191. ICC GUIE, supra note 90, at 45. If the sum in dispute was $So million, the
administrative charges and arbitrator's fees (for one arbitrator) could amount to $20,000.
Id. If more than one arbitrator is appointed, the fee may be increased to up to three times
this amount. If one party refuses to pay its half of the fee, the other party must do so
before the arbitration proceeds. Id. See Torem, supra note x88, at 17-18.
192. A. LowENFELD, supranote 189, at 76-77; Torem, supra note x88, at 20.
r93. On the droit cambiaire in France, see Tait, The Use of Promissory Notes in InternationalLoans: The Eflect of French Law, 4 INT'L Bus. LAw. 249 (976).
194. See generally Lord Hacking, supra note 15, at I.
o
195. See ICC GuInE, supra note 9 , at 20 ("most [arbitrators] are lawyers or university professors:').

198o / judicial Supervision of TransnationalArbitration

117

makes the technical competence of the arbitrator questionable.
The principal disadvantage of arbitration is the risk of legal error in
the decisions of commercial men not trained in law or subject to public
scrutiny. 9 6 Because arbitrators are unlikely to be as skilled as judges
in the consistent application of precedent, the parties are often buying
the proverbial pig in a poke. If a dispute is referred to arbitration after
it arises, the parties' lawyers may stipulate that the arbitrator will decide
only specified questions of fact. When an arbitration agreement covers
future disputes, however, as is the case in most transnational joint
ventures, advance distinction between questions of law and fact is rarely
possible.
The primary advantage of arbitration of international disputes is that
it provides both certainty and neutrality of forum. By resorting to arbitration, -theparties avoid potentially hostile "hometown justice" rendered
by one another's courts. 9T Incentives to avoid the courts of the host
country may be particularly strong when a party deals with a country
where the government exercises close control over economic activity. If the separation between the executive and judicial powers is
not strict, the adversary may also be judge and jury. International
arbitration may be the only practical alternative to dispute settlement
in a host country's national courts. 98
A state which is party to a dispute may also have reasons to remain
out of foreign courts, even if the courts are not those of its potential
adversary. Submission to the jurisdiction of another state may be regarded as a loss of sovereignty, unacceptable to the pride of a developing state.' 9 9 An agreement to arbitrate future disputes in transnational
196. McGovern, supra note x8g, at 71-72.
197. For example, assume that an American shipowner refuses to take delivery of a
multimillion dollar vessel ordered from a shipyard in a small French coastal city, alleging
defects so substantial as to make the ship incomplete according to the contract specifications. The shipyard acts to enjoin the shipowner to take delivery by summary action
brought before the -local tribunal de commerce, presided over by a paint merchant, dependent for business on the shipyard. The shipyard's cash flow problems are such that
without payment for the vessel many local workers will be laid off. At least as to "gray"
areas, a more impartial determination of whether the ship was completed according to
specifications can be expected from arbitrators appointed by the International Chamber of
Commerce, sitting in Paris, than from the local commercial court. Similar considerations
may be applicable to a dispute with a French shipowner, but would not be aggravated by
latent (or overt) xenophobia or language differences.
x9S. See Address by W. L. Craig, Contract Drafting in Countries with Close Governmental Control of the Economy 12, International Chamber of Commerce, Malbun,
Liechtenstein (Sept. 27, 1979).
z99. See Coasmac.
CouaT RatoaT, supra note 3, at 7; McLaughlin, Arbitration and
Developing Countries, 13 INr'L LAw. 211 (1979); Craig, supra note 198, at 12.
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commerce can be used to avoid this problem. It can also provide certainty
of forum and a degree of freedom from -the varying public policies
(ordre public) 210 of the multitudinous jurisdictions which may have a
connection with the transaction.
ArbitralAutonomy
The Interests of the Parties
Many of arbitration's advantages may be vitiated by intervention of
national courts. The dispute is prolonged, secrecy is breached, a state
which is a party may perceive itself to have lost dignity and sovereignty,
and future transactions with beneficial effects on efficient production and
equitable distribution of wealth may be discouraged. 0 1 But precluding
judicial review may also impede the settlement process. Without judicial
review, the parties may be unable to rely on precedent to guide and
predict the outcome of potential disputes. Further, when there is no
assurance that proper legal standards will be applied, parties with weak
legal positions lack incentives to settle.
Some may argue that sophisticated multinational enterprises harm
only themselves by attempting to insulate their commercial ventures
from community norms, and thus have a right to their folly. 2 This
premise is open to question on two counts. First, the voluntary nature
of contracts which exclude judicial review is questionable, given the
widespread use of form contracts and "boilerplate." For example, the
arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce exclude
judicial review regardless of whether this issue was discussed by the
parties 20 3 Second, the effects of arbitrator error may substantially impair
the well-being of persons other than those participating most directly or
visibly in the transaction.
2oo. See generally Delaume, What is an International Contract? An American and
Gallic Dilemma, 28 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 258, 271 (1979). See, e.g., discussion accompanying notes 148-51, 172, 183-85 supra.
201. See the International Chamber of Commerce statement to the plenary conference
organized under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council to draft
the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 26/SR 3 (X958), cited in W. REISMAx, supra note 14, at 827-29 ("the
best way to promote international trade is to interfere with contractual liberty as little as
possible.").
202. See McGovern, supra note 189, at 79.
203. See Article 24 of the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conciliation
and Arbitration, reprintedin ICC GumID, supra note 90, at 43.
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The Interest of Communities Affected by Arbitrator Autonomy
One school of thought maintains that the state always has an interest in
protecting litigants against inconsistent or erroneous application of the
law, and that parties to an arbitration agreement should be protected
against a myopic view of their self-interest that would subject them to
the caprice of an arbitrator without public scrutiny. F. A. Mann advances such a paternalistic attitude:
It is no answer that, if the parties make an agreement to eliminate
the operation of the law, there is no need for protecting them
against their own folly. The law never takes so short-sighted a
view; in numerous cases it invalidates a contract, because it does
not think it proper that the parties should be able to do something
unwise, though not necessarily illegal. This is particularly so where
there is a danger of abuse in cases in which one party is more
powerful than the other. Nor is it an answer to draw attention to
the lack of judicial control over arbitration, which characterizes the
04
law of some countries
The prevalent use of "boilerplate" and standard form contracts"'
can work to the detriment of weaker parties with unsophisticated
counsel2 0 6 For example, assume that a Massachusetts enterprise contracts to supply its technology to a small French chemical manufacturer,
and that French personnel are injured because of improper repairs
made by the seller's grossly negligent technician. The contract provides
that it is to be governed in accordance with English law, and also
provides for arbitration in London, according to International Chamber
of Commerce rules which exclude judicial review of awards2 07 A clause
in the contract exculpates the United States enterprise from all liability
for damage resulting from its own negligence. Although the exclusion
204. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in LDFR AmicoRum FOIL MARTIN DOMRE, supra
note 21, at 157, 176-77205. On the standard form contract, see generally Gluck, Standard Form Contracts:
The ContractTheory Reconsidered, 28 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 72 (1979); Spencer, Signature,
Consent, and the Rule in L'Estrange v. Graucob, 32 CAMB. L.J. 104 (1973).
2o6. The interaction between customers and brokers in commodities futures trading provides an example of the way the "voluntariness" of arbitration may lose its consensual
character. See Smith, Breaking the Chains that Bind: Arbitration Agreements Versus
Forum Rights Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, x6 SAN
DIrcO L. RFv. 749 (1979).
207. See note 90 supra.
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of liability clause is void under Epiglish2" 8 and under French law,"°0
the arbitrator may nonetheless interpret the contract according to his
owA notions of fairness, or he may make an error and enforce the
exculpatory provision. The absence of judicial review would produce
inequitable treatment of the weaker party contrary to the public policy
of both the applicable English law, and the French law.
The Impact of Arbitrator Autonomy on Third Parties 21
That arbitral decisions affect persons not party to the dispute is demonstrated by limits adopted by states on subject matter "arbitrability."
In the United States, the most important non-arbitral issues, at least in
a domestic context,2 11 include antitrust violations, patent infringement,
and securities trading. 22 Subject matter limits also exist in other major
arbitral centers. France, for example, includes a prohibition on domestic
arbitration of any matter to which a state agency is a party.21 8
Even when the subject matter of the dispute does not embody such
important public policy questions as to make arbitral conflict resolution
208. Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, C.50 § 2.
209. C. crv., art. 1628 (Fr.). See Judgment of June 29, 1948, Cass. ciV., 2 GAzErrE Du
PALAIS 179 (1948).
2io. The most direct, and perhaps most troublesome, way that states may vitiate the
effect of arbitral awards on third parties within their jurisdiction is by denying enforcement of the award on "public policy" grounds, a detailed discussion of which is beyond
the scope of this article. The public policy defense is most properly raised at the time
execution of the award is requested, in the forum where the award will have its principal
effect. As an illustration, assume that an arbitral tribunal sitting in London makes an
award in favor of a French claimant against a United States defendant. The English court
will be concerned primarily with insuring the integrity of the arbitral process carried on
within its borders, i.e., with the award's basic validity: that it be arrived at fairly and
rendered within the arbitrator's jurisdiction. The United States court asked to enforce
the award, however, will also care whether the award violates American public policy, a
question that would not normally be answerable by the English court. For example, the
award may violate United States antitrust law, a matter of great concern to the United
States, but not to the English, court. United States federal courts have given a narrow
scope to the public policy defense contained in the 1958 New York Convention, supra note
9, art. V(2) (b). See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci&6 Generale de l'Industrie
du Papier (RAKTA), 5o8 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards may be denied [for public policy reasons] only where enforcement would violate
the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice."). On the public policy defense
in Switzerland and France, see notes 172, 175-85 and accompanying text supra. On the
public policy defense under the 1958 New York Convention, see generally Note, The
Public Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7
CAL. V. INT'L L. RxV. 228 (977)21I. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (974) (issue which is nonarbitrable in a domestic context held arbitrable through the "internationalization" of the
underlying transaction).
212. See notes 148-51 supra.

213. See notes 183-84 supra.
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inappropriate, third parties may be injured by lack of judicial review of
arbitrator error. For example, an arbitrator's misunderstanding of the
force majeure defense may result in rescission of an oil supply agreement, harming persons dependent on that source of oil.
A less dramatic effect of the exclusion of judicial review lies in its
2 14
effect on the development of national commercial law. Amplification
and modification of the law to meet new business needs and changing
community norms is built on the experience of specific cases. Exclusion
of judicial review prevents public consideration of significant controverted fact patterns, thus preventing the articulation of new legal norms.
This consideration loses much of its force when the lex arbitri (the law
of the seat of the arbitration) is not also the substantive law governing
the dispute. For example, in international arbitration dealing with
matters other than shipping or insurance, the parties may frequently
choose an applicable law other than English, even though they have
selected London as the seat of the arbitration. In such cases, judicial
review cannot be expected to make a contribution to English law.216
The Integrity of the Award:
Excess of Authority and Timing of Review
When one party regrets having renounced its recourse to the courts, it
may refuse to abide by an award and may ask for judicial intervention.
To avoid being instruments of unfairness, most courts have not completely abdicated their supervisory role, and will deny enforcement of
awards rendered in excess of the arbitrator's power.216 As discussed
previously, an error of law frequently also constitutes an excess of
authority.2 17 Lack of a clear line distinguishing the two makes it hard
for courts to limit the scope of their review.
According to the 1958 New York Convention, excess of authority is
2r4. See COInERCIAL COUR REPORT, supra note 3, at x2; McGovern, supra note r8g,
at 76-78. The importance of judicial review in the development of English law was
presented by the Lord Chancellor, Elwyn-Jones, as a reason not to permit "contracting out"
of judicial review for "special category" disputes in maritime, insurance, and commodities
areas. 397 PAtRL. DEB., supra note 3, at 440, reprinted in 45 AaB. 10, 12-13 (1979)

("[T]he retention of a right to recourse to the courts from such arbitrations is very
important to the proper development of English commercial law and its maintenance as
the first choice of law in international commerce.").
215. For this reason, exclusion of review was permitted for "special category" disputes
which were not governed by English law. See note 86 supra.
2x6. See, e.g., notes and text accompanying notes 126, 143-47, 163-67, 179-82 supra.
217. See text accompanying notes 93-1o8 supra.
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a ground for refusal to enforce a foreign award: "Recognition of the
award may be refused [if] [t]he award ... contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration." 2 1 Yet if
the issue of arbitral authority may ultimately be determined by the state
in which enforcement is sought, it can be argued that the issue need not
be investigated in the state of the arbitrator's seat. Indeed, one of the
themes of the 1958 Convention was that two proceedings should not be
needed to confirm an award: the so-called "double exequatur." 21 0
While the point about double exequatur has force, it fails to recognize that a foreign award rendered in a state party to the 1958 Convention is presumed valid.220 To ensure the award's integrity, any
excess of authority should be dealt with by the lex arbitri.This procedure avoids the considerable inconvenience involved in attacking an
invalid award in each of the many states where the award might be
enforced against the award debtor's property. It also furthers uniformity,
rather than allowing the issue to be decided differently by different
states. Such uniformity increases fairness to the contesting party, who
has had an opportunity to resolve conclusively his objection to excess of
arbitral jurisdiction in the state where he has been obligated to arbitrate.
221
Some parties to the 1958 Convention, including the United States,
apply its provisions only to awards rendered in the territory of another
contracting state. By allowing the award to be rendered on its territory,
thereby permitting it to benefit in other contracting states from the
presumption of validity under the 1958 Convention,222 a state may
directly facilitate enforcement of an award. When a state lends itself to
the enforcement process in such manner, it may be appropriate for it
to provide a procedure for interlocutory clarification of the scope of
22 3
arbitral authority.
CONCLUSION
The chief advantage of arbitration to parties involved in transnational
commerce is that it provides a neutral forum for the resolution of disputes. However, there are several interests which argue against keeping
218. New York Convention, supra note 9, art. V(x) (e).
219. Quigley, supra note 9, at xo6g.
220. New York Convention, supra note 9, art. III.
221. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1979). See also Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821, 823. The right of contracting parties to restrict enforcement on
the basis of reciprocity is provided in the New York Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(3).
222. See note 220 supra.

223. Because the New York Convention leaves unsettled the question of whether an
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the arbitral process completely independent of national court systems,
particularly in view of the parties' frequent recourse to the courts to
enforce arbitral awards. First, the arbitrator must be prevented from
exceeding the authority granted him in the compromis, so that the
state does not lend itself, even indirectly, to the enforcement of an
improper award. Second, the parties may want to insure against erratic
and unpredictable results. Third, states may want to review arbitral
decisions to protect weak parties, third parties, or their national interests.
There is an inherent tension between the parties' interest in avoiding
judicial review and both party and state interests in relying on such
review. The 1979 Act sought to resolve this tension by allowing parties
to preclude judicial review of international contracts. However, precluding review is illusory. English courts may interpret excess of
authority to be arbitrator misconduct, an act for which judicial review
is available. That the English have not, in other contexts, distinguished
error of law from excess of authority indicates that this approach could
undermine the objectives of the law. Moreover, if the issue of excessive
authority is not litigated when the arbitration takes place in England,
it could be litigated in the courts of the state where enforcement is
sought.
Rather than attempting to preclude judicial review entirely, it would
have been preferable to have adopted a practical procedure for rapid
interlocutory review of excess of authority, which might satisfactorily
mediate the parties' concerns for neutrality and predictability. Alternatively, Parliament might have curbed abuse of the case stated
procedure by reversing Lysland,22 4 or by requiring the party requesting
judicial review to bear the expenses of appeal in cases where the court
came to the same conclusion as the arbitrator.
Timing is the essential problem which concerns judicial review of
arbitration. Complete exclusion of judicial review is impossible because
the New York Convention permits an examination of arbitrator excess
of authority before enforcement of an award in foreign courts. Accelerating the review would give the award debtor a chance to clarify the
award is "binding" before termination of appellate review, G. DELAM mE, supra note x2,
at § 13.14; Quigley, supra note 9, at o6g, a post-award challenge procedure would not
necessarily foreclose foreign enforcement proceedings unless the enforcing court exercised
its discretion under Convention Article VI to adjourn its decision. See generally Libyan
G.M.T.O. v. Gtaverken Arendal Aktiebolag, Swedish Supreme Court Decision No. SO
1462, August 13, 1979.
224. See note 33 supra.
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scope of arbitral authority in the state where the award is rendered.
Acceleration would increase the probability that the result of such an
inquiry would be the same wherever enforcement is sought, thereby
furthering equity, as well as efficiency, in transuational commerce.
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